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Abstract—We design a classifier for transactional datasets with
application in malware detection. We build the classifier based on
the minimum description length (MDL) principle. This involves
selecting a model that best compresses the training dataset for
each class considering the MDL criterion. To select a model for a
dataset, we first use clustering followed by closed frequent pattern
mining to extract a subset of closed frequent patterns (CFPs). We
show that this method acts as a pattern summarization method
to avoid pattern explosion; this is done by giving priority to
longer CFPs, and without requiring to extract all CFPs. We
then use the MDL criterion to further summarize extracted
patterns, and construct a code table of patterns. This code
table is considered as the selected model for the compression
of the dataset. We evaluate our classifier for the problem of
static malware detection in portable executable (PE) files. We
consider API calls of PE files as their distinguishing features.
The presence-absence of API calls forms a transactional dataset.
Using our proposed method, we construct two code tables, one
for the benign training dataset, and one for the malware training
dataset. Our dataset consists of 19696 benign, and 19696 malware
samples, each a binary sequence of size 22761. We compare our
classifier with deep neural networks providing us with the state-
of-the-art performance. The comparison shows that our classifier
performs very close to deep neural networks. We also discuss
that our classifier is an interpretable classifier. This provides the
motivation to use this type of classifiers where some degree of
explanation is required as to why a sample is classified under
one class rather than the other class.
Index Terms—Transactional Dataset, Frequent Pattern Min-
ing, Supervised Learning, Minimum Description Length, Inter-
pretable Machine Learning, Static Malware Detection
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning algorithms are being widely deployed
in different applications as automated decision-making tools
due to their generalization capabilities. This includes malware
detection which is our main concern in this work. Traditional
algorithms for malware detection search for known signa-
tures which requires them to have a copy of all malware
samples. These algorithms are not effective nowadays as (i)
polymorphism is used within a malware family, (ii) the number
of new malware families is increasingly growing, and (iii)
they are not capable of zero-day malware detection. Machine
learning algorithms are good candidates for automated malware
detection. This is because they can extract complex patterns
using different attributes of a malware, and also they can help
with zero-day malware detection as they can generalize to new
samples [1].
Malware detection can be divided into two main categories
of dynamic (behavioral) and static (code) malware detection.
In dynamic malware detection, samples are executed, and their
run-time behavior is monitored to create indicators of malicious
activities. In this type of malware detection, malware samples
can easily adapt their run-time behavior to evade detection
when they are aware of the normal behavior. In static malware
detection, binary codes of samples are examined without
executing them to create indicators of malicious activities. In
this work, we consider malware detection in portable executable
(PE) files using static analysis. Different types of features have
been used for static malware detection in PE files such as
API calls [2], byte-level N-grams [3], features from the PE
header [4], and a combination of different types of features [5].
We consider API calls of PE files to distinguish between
malware and benign samples. The presence-absence of API
calls forms a transactional dataset. Transactional datasets can
also appear in other applications such as healthcare where a
sample represents a set of symptoms of a patient, marketing
where a sample represents a basket of items purchased by a
customer, and natural language processing where a sample
represents a set of terms in a document.
A major challenge in designing classifiers for malware
detection is that malware authors actively try to evade anti-
malware systems by modifying existing malware samples
without changing their functionalities. Therefore, the final aim
is to develop a classifier that not only has a high performance
considering available samples, but is also robust to functionality-
preserving modifications. The first step towards having a robust
classifier is to understand why a sample is classified under
one class rather than the other one. This helps to develop
a better understanding of how the model works, which in
turn can be used to make the model more robust to evasion
attacks. Therefore, interpretability is an important property for
a classifier to improve its robustness. An interpretable model
should be able to provide some good explanations to its users
as to why a specific decision is made regarding a given sample.
Several properties are considered for a good explanation to a
user [6]. One important property is that explanations need to
be contrastive. This means that a user is interested to know
not only why a decision is made but also why not another
decision. Another important property is that explanations need
to be succinct. This means that they need to provide a short
list of important reasons for a decision rather a complete list of
reasons. There are also several other important motivations for
having an interpretable machine learning model. One is that
interpretable models help us to understand the scenarios where
these models fail. This is important where wrong decisions by
a model have serious consequences. For instance, classifying
a malware sample as benign can bring the whole critical
infrastructure down. Another important motivation is to detect
biases in models. This can happen when a model is trained
on a biased training dataset. Having an interpretable model
helps us to extract these biases by looking at the reasons for
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2its decisions.
In this work, we design an MDL-based classifier as a type
of intrinsically interpretable models. Intrinsic in the sense that
the model itself is interpretable due to its structure. The design
involves selecting a model that best describes (compresses)
the training dataset for each class considering the MDL
criterion. The MDL principle has already been used for both
classification and anomaly detection in transactional datasets
[7]–[10]. However, our proposed model-selection method is
able to handle much larger datasets (more than 10 to 100
times larger).
We search among code tables of patterns as the family of
models for the compression of transactional datasets. Code table
construction can also be viewed as a pattern summarization
problem aimed at selecting a small interesting subset of a large
list of candidate patterns. The MDL criterion selects a subset
of patterns that best describes the dataset under consideration,
i.e., shortest possible description. The code table of selected
patterns is considered as the selected model by the MDL
criterion [7]. In transactional datasets, closed frequent pattern
mining (CFPM) [11] is used to created the large list of candidate
patterns required for code table construction. Frequent patterns
are sets of items occurring together more than a user-decided
threshold. Closed frequent patterns (CFPs) are those frequent
patterns that do not have a superset with the same number of
occurrence. In large datasets, having a large threshold causes
obvious and short patterns, and having a small threshold can
cause pattern explosion which makes both pattern mining, and
code table construction computationally very expensive.
We therefore propose an MDL-based model-selection method
for large transactional datasets. In our method, we first employ
clustering to divide our dataset into a number of clusters. We
then select a subset of clusters based on a criterion proposed
to determine the quality of a cluster. We next perform CFPM
in only high-quality clusters separately. The outputs of CFPM
for all high-quality clusters are merged as the final output of
CFPM. This approach extracts a subset of all CFPs for our
dataset. We show that our approach helps to avoid pattern
explosion by considering priority for longer CFPs, and without
requiring to extract all CFPs. We finally use the MDL criterion
to further summarize extracted patterns, and construct a code
table of patterns as the selected model.
We utilize our classifier for static malware detection in
PE files using a dataset consisting of 19696 benign, and
19696 malware samples each a binary sequence of size 22761
(representing 22761 unique API calls in our dataset). We
compare our classifier with deep neural networks providing us
with the state-of-the-art performance. The comparison shows
that our classifier performs very close to neural networks. We
also discuss about the interpretability of our classifier, and how
it can help to understand why a sample is classified under one
class rather than the other class.
Organization: This work is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we present some preliminaries for transactional datasets.
In Section III, we describe the MDL principle and its appli-
cations for pattern summarization, classification and anomaly
detection. In Section IV, we present our proposed method
for MDL-based model selection. In Section V, we show the
advantages of our proposed method for model selection, and
also compare our classifier with deep neural networks. In
Section VI, we discuss about the interpretability of our classifier.
In Section VII, we conclude the work. In Appendix, we review
two algorithms that we use for CFPM, and clustering.
II. TRANSACTIONAL DATASETS
In this section, we present some preliminaries for transac-
tional datasets, and also outline some issues related to CFPM
and clustering for these datasets.
A. Preliminaries
Assuming that a dataset consists of m possible items,
I = {1, 2, 3, . . . ,m} represents the set of all items. The whole
dataset, denoted by D, is a non-empty multiset (bag) of
transactions, i.e., D = {T1, T2, . . . , Tn}, where each transaction
is a subset of I, i.e., Tj ⊆ I. We say that a transaction Tj
supports an itemset P (which is also a subset of I) if P ⊆ Tj .
The support of an itemset, denoted by sup(·), is the number of
transactions that support the itemset. Considering D(P) as the
multiset of transactions that support the itemset P , and D(Q)
as the multiset of transactions that support the itemset Q, we
therefore have
• sup(P) = |D(P)|,
• D(P ∪Q) = D(P) ∩ D(Q),
• If P ⊆ Q, then D(P) ⊇ D(Q),
• If P ⊆ Q, then sup(P) ≥ sup(Q),
where | · | denotes the cardinality of a multiset.
B. Closed Frequent Pattern Mining
We here address the problem of CFPM in transactional
datasets [11]. An itemset is frequent if its support is greater
than or equal to a user-decided threshold, denoted by minsup.
A frequent itemset is closed if it has no superset with the same
support. We employ the Linear Time Closed Itemset Mining
(LCM) algorithm [12] to directly extracts CFPs. This is as
opposed to first extracting all frequent patterns (via algorithms
such as the Apriori algorithm [13]), and then selecting the
subset of CFPs. The LCM algorithm can dramatically reduce
the computation time when the number of frequent patterns
is exponentially larger than the number of CFPs. Refer to
Appendix for an overview of the LCM algorithm
C. Clustering
We here address the problem of clustering for transactional
datasets. As traditional clustering algorithms using a pair-
wise similarity do not perform well for transactional datasets,
several algorithms have been developed for these datasets which
consider a global criterion function [14], [15]. Using a global
criterion function has also this advantage that the user does not
need to know the number of clusters in advance. The global
criterion function is defined such that intra-cluster similarity is
maximised, and inter-cluster similarity is minimised.
In this work, we employ the Clustering with sLOPE (CLOPE)
algorithm [15] which is a fast and scalable algorithm for
clustering transactional datasets. In this algorithm, we do not
3need to know the number of clusters in advance. The two
parameters of this algorithm are repulsion factor, used to control
intra-cluster similarity, and maximum cluster number, used to
provide an upper limit for the number of clusters. Refer to
Appendix for an overview of the CLOPE algorithm
III. MDL PRINCIPLE AND ITS APPLICATIONS
In this section, we present the MDL principle, and its
applications for pattern summarization, classification, and
anomaly detection.
A. MDL Principle
Kolmogorov complexity theory, also known as algorithmic
information theory, was developed to measure the information
in objects in isolation, i.e., without knowing the distribution
underlying the object. As in data mining, we normally do not
know the underlying distribution of our data, we use algorithmic
information theory to measure the information in our data.
The Kolmogorov complexity of an object is the descriptive
complexity of the object, which is the length of the shortest
computer program that can describe the object. This is formally
defined as follows [16].
Definition 1: The Kolmogorov complexity of an object x
with respect to a universal computer U , denoted by KU (x), is
defined as
KU (x) = min
prog:U(prog)=x
`(prog),
which is the minimum length over all programs that print x
and halt.
However, we cannot compute the Kolmogorov complexity of
an object. Therefore, in practice, the MDL principle is utilized.
Using the crude MDL criterion, we choose a model from a
family of models, M, that minimizes the two-term objective
function `(x | Mi) + `(Mi) where `(x | Mi) is the number
of bits required to describe the object given the model, and
`(Mi) is the number of bits required to describe the model
itself. Hence, using the crude MDL criterion, we have
`best(x) = min
Mi∈M
(`(x |Mi) + `(Mi)).
B. MDL-based Pattern summarization
The MDL principle can be used for pattern summarization
where we want to select a small subset of an existing large set
of candidate patterns denoted by F . In this part, we present
the algorithm proposed by Vreeken et al. [7] which uses
the MDL principle for pattern summarization. This algorithm
performs pattern summarization by searching among code
tables of patterns as the family of models to describe the
data. A code table, denoted by CT , has two columns: the first
column consists of selected patterns, and the second column
consists of binary codes used to encode the patterns in the
first column. This algorithm, which basically outputs a semi-
adaptive compression dictionary, selects the best code table
as
CTbest = argmin
CT
(`(D | CT ) + `(CT )). (1)
In the algorithm, as the search space for constructing code
tables is very large, a heuristic approach is used to select the
best code table. This heuristic approach consists of three steps.
In the first step, candidate patterns in the set F are ordered
descending first by their support, second by their length. In the
second step, a standard code table consisting of all singleton
items is constructed. In the third step, candidate patterns from
the ordered F are examined one by one. In this step, if adding
a candidate pattern to the current code table results in a smaller
objective function, i.e., `(D | CT ) + `(CT ), it is kept in the
code table, otherwise it is dropped. This leads to keeping only
a small subset of F in the final code table. The patterns in the
final code table are considered as the patterns chosen by the
MDL principle.
We here explain how the two terms `(D|CT ) and `(CT )
in equation (1) are calculated. The first term in equation (1),
`(D | CT ), is calculated as
`(D | CT ) =
∑
T ∈D
`(T | CT ) =
∑
T ∈D
∑
P∈C(T )
`(P | CT ),
where `(P | CT ) is the length of the binary code for the pattern
P , and C(T ) is the set of patterns used to cover T . The patterns
covering a transaction satisfy the following properties
∀ Pi,Pj ∈ C(T ), if Pi 6= Pj then Pi ∩ Pj = ∅,
and ⋃
P∈C(T )
P = T .
As there can be several ways (different sets of patterns)
to cover a transaction, the patterns in the code table are
ordered descending first by their length, next by their support;
the patterns are selected according to this order to cover a
transaction.
The lengths of binary codes in the second column of the code
table, i.e., `(P | CT ), are determined by the Shannon code
which is a prefix code. The more a pattern used in the cover
of transactions, the shorter its code. Therefore, by defining the
usage of a pattern P as
usage(P) = |{T ∈ D : P ⊆ C(T )}| ,
the code for the pattern P is of length
`(P | CT ) = d− logPr(P | D)e
=
⌈
− log
(
usage(P)∑
P′∈CT usage(P ′)
)⌉
.
The second term in equation (1), `(CT ), is calculated as
`(CT ) =
∑
i∈I
ni log(|I|+ 1) +
∑
P∈CT
log(|I|+ 1)
+
∑
P∈CT
`(P | CT ), (2)
where ni is the number of times that item i appears in the
patterns in the first column of the code table. The number of
all possible items in first column of the code table considering
a separator between each two patterns is |I| + 1. The first
two terms on the left-hand side of equation (2) correspond to
4encoding the first column of the code table. The last term on
the left-hand side of equation (2) corresponds to encoding the
second column of the code table consisting of prefix binary
codes.
1) Example: We here provide an example for pattern
summarization. In this example, we consider the following
dataset which consists of five items and 10 transactions.
1 2 3 4 5
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
Each row represents a transaction. This dataset can be repre-
sented as
D = {{1, 2, 3, 4}2, {1, 2, 4}, {2, 3, 4, 5},
{3, 4, 5}, {4, 5}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}} ,
where D is a multiset, and the superscript for an element
shows the multiplicity of that element. We use CFPM with
minsup = 1 to extract all CFPs of this dataset. This is to
form the list of candidate patterns required to construct an
MDL-based code table for this dataset. Using extracted CFPs,
the ordered list of candidate patterns is
P sup(P)
{4} 7
{3} 5
{2} 5
{3, 4} 4
{2, 4} 4
{5} 4
{2, 3, 4} 3
{1, 2, 4} 3
{4, 5} 3
{1, 2, 3, 4} 2
{3, 4, 5} 2
{2, 3, 4, 5} 1
The final code table using the described approach is
P binary code length
{1, 2, 4} 3
{4} 3
{3} 2
{2} 4
{5} 3
{1} 8
which shows the effectiveness of the MDL principle for pattern
summarization. In the second column of the code table, we
have provided the lengths of binary codes than binary codes
themselves. This is because the lengths are important than the
codes themselves. Note that item 1 does not appear in the
CFPM MDL-BasedD MD
Code Table
Fig. 1. The two-step KRIMP method for MDL-based model selection.
cover of any transactions, i.e., its usage is equal to zero. We
keep all singleton items in the final code table by giving them
a small usage when their usage is zero. This is to be able to
cover any unseen transactions.
C. MDL-based Classifier
We here explain how to utilize the MDL principle to build
a binary classifier. Supervised learning consists of two phases
of training and test. In the training phase, we select a model
that best describes the training dataset of each class using the
MDL criterion
MD1 = argmin
Mi∈M
(`(D1 |Mi) + `(Mi)),
MD2 = argmin
Mi∈M
(`(D2 |Mi) + `(Mi)).
In the test phase, if for a transaction T , we have
`(T |MD2) < `(T |MD1),
this implies that
Pr(T | D2) > Pr(T | D1).
Consequently, we classify the sample T under the second class.
Otherwise, we classify it under the first class. Note that the
term `(Mi) in the crude MDL criterion prevents the model to
be overfitted during the training phase.
D. MDL-based Anomaly Detector
We here explain how to utilize the MDL principle to build
an anomaly detector. In anomaly detection, we assume that we
have access to only a dataset of normal samples (possibly with
some small numbers of anomalies which have been mislabelled
as normal samples). Therefore, we just select a model that best
describes the normal dataset, D, using the MDL criterion
MD = argmin
Mi∈M
(`(D |Mi) + `(Mi)).
Hence, if for the two sample T1 and T2, we have
`(T1 |MD) < `(T2 |MD),
this implies
P (T1 | D) > P (T2 | D).
This says that the larger `(T |MD), the smaller P (T | D).
Therefore, in this method, we need to define a threshold θ
using which we say that a sample is anomaly if
`(T |MD) > θ.
5IV. PROPOSED METHOD FOR MODEL SELECTION
In this work, we aim to construct a classifier for large
transactional datasets based on the MDL principle. To do so, as
mentioned earlier, we need to select a model that best describes
the training dataset for each class using the MDL criterion. This
can be done using the two-step KRIMP algorithm proposed by
Vreeken et al. [7], shown in Fig. 1. In this algorithm, CFPM is
first used to extract all CFPs. These CFPs are then considered
as candidates patterns to construct a code table of patterns as
described in Section III-B. The code table is considered as
the selected model by the MDL criterion. However, for large
datasets, this algorithm can be computationally very expensive.
In the first step, having a small minsup in CFPM can lead
to pattern explosion, and consequently extracting all CFPs is
computationally very expensive. In the second step, we need
to test each extracted pattern to decide whether to keep the
pattern in the final code table or to drop the pattern. This
step is also computationally expensive, and very slow. This
is because this step needs to be done for all extracted CFPs
in a specific serial order (it cannot be parallelized), and also
the whole dataset is used for testing each pattern. To address
these problems, we propose using clustering in conjunction
with CFPM. We show that this approach extracts a subset of all
CFPs by giving priority to longer CFPs. Here, we first explain
how clustering affects CFPM. We then present our MDL-based
model-selection method.
A. CFPM after Clustering
We consider applying a CFPM algorithm to the clusters of
a dataset separately, and then taking the union over the outputs
of the CFPM algorithm for clusters. This provides us with
a subset of all CFPs for the whole dataset (i.e., the output
of directly applying a CFPM algorithm to the whole dataset).
This is because if a pattern is a CFP considering one of the
clusters, it is also a CFP considering the whole dataset. We
here discuss that this method can be considered as a pattern
summarization method that gives priority to longer patters. This
is important for our application as the compression is mainly
achieved through longer patterns.
To cluster the whole dataset, we utilize a clustering algorithm
designed for transactional datasets as described in Section II-C.
The clustering algorithm tries to group similar transactions
into one cluster, and dissimilar ones into separate clusters.
This implies that the longer a pattern supported by several
transactions, the higher the probability that clustering groups
those transactions into one cluster. After clustering, four types
of clusters can exist corresponding to a CFP: Type-I cluster
where the support of the pattern is zero; Type-II cluster where
the support of the pattern is non-zero but less than minsup;
Type-III cluster where the support of the pattern is greater
than minsup, but there is a superset for the pattern with the
same support; and Type-IV cluster where the support of the
pattern is greater than minsup, and there is no superset for the
pattern with the same support. Therefore, if we do not have
any Type-IV clusters corresponding to a CFP, clustering leads
to dropping that pattern. We divide cases leading to dropping
a CFP into two scenarios. In the first scenario, all clusters are
Type-I or Type III. In the second scenario, there is at least one
Type-II cluster. In both scenarios, we do not have any Type-IV
clusters.
We here show these two scenarios via two examples. In these
two examples, we use the CLOPE algorithm with repulsion
factor equal to four, and maximum cluster number equal to
two. We also consider minsup to be two.
In this first example where we face the first scenario, our
dataset consists of five items and seven transactions as shown
here
1 2 3 4 5
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1
which is represented as
D = {{1, 2, 3, 4}2, {2, 3, 4, 5}2, {3, 4, 5}2, {4, 5}} .
The CFPs of this dataset are
CFPw = {{1, 2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4, 5},
{3, 4, 5}, {3, 4}, {4}, {4, 5}} .
After clustering, the following two clusters are formed
C1 =
{{1, 2, 3, 4}2} ,
C2 =
{{2, 3, 4, 5}2, {3, 4, 5}2, {4, 5}} ,
and the union of CFPs for these two clusters is
CFPc = {{1, 2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4, 5}, {3, 4, 5}, {4, 5}} .
For any of the missing CFPs, both clusters are Type-III.
In this second example where we face the second scenario,
our dataset consists of nine items and four transactions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
which is represented as
D = {{7, 8, 9}, {4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, {1, 2, 3}} .
The CFPs of this dataset are
CFPw = {{7, 8, 9}, {4, 5, 6}, {1, 2, 3}} .
After clustering, these two clusters are formed
C1 = {{7, 8, 9}} ,
C2 = {{4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, {1, 2, 3}} ,
and the union of CFPs for these two clusters is
CFPc = {{4, 5, 6}, {1, 2, 3}} .
It can be seen the pattern {7, 8, 9} is dropped as the result of
clustering. Both clusters are Type-II for this pattern.
6Clustering Selecting
HQ Clusters
D MDMDL-BasedCode Table
Cluster 1HQ
CFPM
Merging
CFPs
···
···
Ranking &
Cluster 2HQ
CFPM
Cluster 3HQ
CFPM
Cluster qHQ
CFPM
Fig. 2. Proposed method for MDL-based model selection.
The patterns dropped as the result of facing the first scenario
are those which are formed from the intersection of longer
CFPs. In both scenarios, the patterns dropped as the result of
clustering are mainly from shorter patterns. That is why we
consider CFPM after clustering as a pattern summarization
method which gives priority to longer patterns.
B. Proposed Model-Selection Method
In this section, we explain our proposed MDL-based model-
selection method shown in Fig. 2.
As discussed in the last section, we use clustering in
conjunction with CFPM to extract a subset of CFPs by giving
priority to longer patterns. The maximum number of clusters
can be decided based on the parameter minsup. The larger
the parameter minsup, the smaller the number of clusters.
For a large minsup, we do not face pattern explosion, and
consequently we do not need clustering. We use this method
when we have a small minsup, and as a result we face pattern
explosion. This is to directly avoid pattern explosion, i.e., not
by first extracting all CFPs, and then selecting a subset of
them. As our target is to minimize the probability that a long
CFP is dropped, and also maximize pattern summarization, we
propose the following strategy. We first cluster the dataset, and
rank clusters according to the following criterion
Quality(Ci) =
H(Ci)
|Ci| , (3)
where H(Ci) and |Ci| are the height and the number of
transactions of cluster i respectively. The height of cluster
Ci is defined as
H(Ci) =
∑
Tj∈Ci |Tj |
| ∪Tj∈Ci Tj |
.
The cluster quality takes a value between zero and one. It
is equal to one where all the transactions of a cluster are
the same (the highest quality). We next select a subgroup
of clusters as high-quality (HQ) clusters by setting a quality
threshold, and perform CFPM in only HQ clusters. In HQ
clusters, transactions share majority of their items, and as a
result the number of CFPs in these clusters is not large even
by considering a small minsup. Low-quality (LQ) clusters are
the main reason for pattern explosion, and the output of CFPM
in these clusters consists of mainly short patterns.
As the output of the pattern-mining stage, we take the union
over the outputs of CFPM in HQ clusters. We finally construct
a code table of patterns according to Section III-B as the
selected model.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first compare our proposed model-
selection method with the two-step KRIMP method using
the small mushroom dataset. This is to show the advantages of
our proposed model-selection method in pattern summarization,
and constructing a code table. We then evaluate our classifier
on a large dataset of API calls for static malware detection
in PE files. We also compare our classifier with deep neural
networks providing us with the state-of-the-art performance in
static malware detection.
A. Small Dataset
We use the mushroom dataset to compare our model-
selection method with the KRIMP method. The mushroom
dataset, which is a categorical dataset, consists of 4208 edible
samples, and 3916 poisonous samples. After converting the
dataset into a transactional dataset using one-hot encoding,
each sample of the dataset is a binary sequence of size 117.
1) KRIMP Method: We here use the KRIMP method, shown
in Fig. 1, to construct a code table, CTe, for the edible dataset,
De, and a code table, CTp, for the poisonous dataset, Dp. We
first use the LCM algorithm for CFPM. Considering minsup to
be 0.5 percent of the dataset size for each class (i.e., minsup =
21.04 for the edible dataset, and minsup = 19.6 for the
poisonous dataset), we have 34781 CFPs in the edible dataset,
and 24041 CFPs in the poisonous dataset. Using extracted CFPs
as candidate patterns, we then construct two code tables for
the edible, and the poisonous datasets. The final code table for
the edible dataset consists of 238 patterns, and the one for the
poisonous dataset consists of 176 patterns. Using constructed
code tables via the KRIMP method, we have
`(De | CTe) + `(CTe) = 182190 bits,
`(Dp | CTp) + `(CTp) = 177215 bits,
7which show the compression achieved for the edible, and the
poisonous datasets. Before the compression, the edible dataset
consists of 4208 × 117 = 492336 bits, and the poisonous
dataset consists of 3916× 117 = 458172 bits.
2) Proposed Method: We here use our proposed method,
shown in Fig. 2, to construct a code table for the edible dataset,
and a code table for the poisonous dataset. To cluster the dataset
for each class, we use the CLOPE algorithm with repulsion
factor equal to four, and maximum cluster number equal to
eight. This provides us with eight clusters for the edible dataset,
and six clusters for the poisonous dataset. The cluster qualities
of the edible dataset are 0.73, 0.71, 0.71, 0.67, 0.28, 0.63, 0.73,
and 0.76. We consider all edible clusters as HQ clusters. The
cluster qualities of the poisonous dataset are 0.71, 0.71, 0.65,
0.65, 0.35, and 0.58. We also consider all poisonous clusters
as HQ clusters.
After clustering, we now perform CFPM in all clusters
separately. We again consider minsup to be 0.5 percent of the
dataset size for each class, i.e., minsup = 21.04 for edible
clusters, and minsup = 19.6 for poisonous clusters. After
taking the union over the outputs of CFPM in different clusters,
we have 10831 CFPs corresponding to the edible dataset, and
16554 CFPs corresponding to the poisonous dataset. Note that
we now have a shorter list of candidate patterns corresponding
to each dataset compared to the KRIMP method.
Using extracted CFPs as candidate patterns, we finally
construct two code tables for the edible and the poisonous
datasets. The final code table for the edible dataset consists of
183 patterns, and the one for the poisonous dataset consists of
186 patterns. Using constructed code tables via our method,
we have
`(De | CTe) + `(CTe) = 184299 bits,
`(Dp | CTp) + `(CTp) = 181261 bits.
This shows that even after making the list of candidate
patterns shorter using our proposed method, we can achieve
the same order of compression as the KRIMP method. As the
CLOPE algorithm in our method is a low complexity, and
fast algorithm, our method makes the process of code table
construction computationally much less expensive specially for
large transactional datasets.
B. Malware Detection Dataset
We use the dataset provided by Al-Dujaili et al. [2] to test
our classifier for static malware detection in PE files. Our
dataset is constructed using 14772 benign training samples,
14772 malware training samples, 4924 benign test samples,
and 4924 malware test samples. The total number of API calls
in the dataset is 22761. Therefore, each sample of the dataset
is a binary sequence of size 22761 where the locations of ones
determine API calls of that sample.
1) Neural Network and Its Performance: We use fully
connected feed-forward neural networks to find the state-of-
the-art performance for our malware dataset. We use five-fold
cross validation to optimize hyper-parameters of our network.
Our network consists of five layers: one input layer of size
22761, three hidden layers of size 300, and one output layer of
size two. Rectified linear unit (ReLU) is used as the activation
function at the hidden layers, and softmax function is used
at the output layer. We use drop out rate of 50 percent to
avoid over-fitting. The size of mini-batches is 100 samples, the
learning rate of Adam optimizer is 0.0001, and the number of
epochs is 50. The accuracy, false positive rate (FPR), and false
negative rate (FNR) obtained by this network are 91.91, 8.04,
and 8.12 percent respectively.
2) Proposed Classifier and Its Performance: We first use the
KRIMP method, shown in Fig. 1, for our dataset. Considering
minsup to be 60 percent of the training dataset size for each
class, i.e., minsup = 8863.2, we have 7769 CFPs in the benign
training dataset, and 2058 CFPs in the malware training dataset.
Using these CFPs as candidate patterns, we construct two code
tables for the benign and the malware training datasets referred
to as CTb and CTm respectively. We decide a sample in the
test dataset to be malicious if
`(T |CTm) ≤ `(T |CTb), (4)
and to be bengin otherwise. The accuracy, FPR, and FNR
obtained by this approach are 85.29, 4.18, and 25.22 percent
respectively. In order to improve the performance, we try
to use a smaller minsup by which we can extract longer
patterns as candidates patterns for model selection. However,
by decreasing minsup to be 50 percent of the training dataset
size for each class, i.e., minsup = 7386, we have 218608
CFPs in the benign training dataset, and 85842 CFPs in the
malware training dataset. As it can be seen, by decreasing the
threshold by only ten percent of the dataset size, we have a
dramatic increase in the number of CFPs. This prevents us from
using the KRIMP method as we need to set a much smaller
minsup, and consequently the complexity of both CFPM, and
code table construction dramatically increases.
We therefore use our proposed approach. To cluster the
training dataset for each class, we use the CLOPE algorithm
with repulsion factor equal to four, and maximum cluster
number equal to eight. This provides us with eight clusters
for each of the benign, and the malware training datasets. The
cluster qualities of the benign training dataset are 0.85, 0.67,
0.25, 0.69, 0.58, 0.84, 0.03, and 0.29. We consider only the
cluster with quality 0.03 as a LQ cluster, and consider the rest
as HQ clusters. The cluster qualities of the malware training
dataset are 0.99, 0.33, 0.89, 0.01, 0.69, 0.36, 0.47, and 0.59.
We consider only the cluster with quality 0.01 as a LQ cluster
and consider the rest as HQ clusters.
After clustering, and selecting HQ clusters, we now perform
CFPM for HQ clusters separately. We consider minsup to
be 0.5 percent of the training dataset size for each class, i.e.
minsup = 73.86. After taking the union, we have 24274 CFPs
corresponding to the benign training dataset, and 812 CFPs
corresponding to the malware training dataset. Note that we
now only have a small number of candidate patterns for each
training dataset even by considering a very small minsup.
We finally construct two code tables using extracted patterns
as candidate patterns for the benign and the malware training
datasets. Using these selected models, and the decision criterion
in (4), the accuracy, FPR, and FNR of our approach are 89.43,
12.77, and 8.36 percent respectively. It can be seen that we
8have been able to improve the accuracy to be very close to the
one for deep neural networks. In the next section, we discuss
that MDL-based classifiers can be considered as interpretable
classifiers which motivates us to use them even by paying a
small penalty in accuracy.
VI. INTERPRETABILITY OF MDL-BASED CLASSIFIERS
In this section, we illustrate the interpretability of MDL-
based classifiers. As mentioned in the introduction, interpretabil-
ity is about understanding why a decision is made rather than
just what is the decision. Methods to interpret machine learning
models are classified into two classes of intrinsic and post
hoc methods. Intrinsic interpretability is when the machine
learning model itself is interpretable due to its structure. Post
hoc interpretability is when a method is developed to interpret
a machine learning model after its training. Machine learning
models that are intrinsically interpretable can also be used
as a post hoc method by approximating the main model
in order to explain its decisions. We here show that MDL-
based classifiers can be considered as intrinsically interpretable
models. Considering a two-class classifier, we can easily
understand why a sample is classified under one class rather
than the other one in the following cases.
Case 1: The cover of a sample using the code table for one
class consists of a few long and several short patterns, and the
cover using the code table for the other class consists of many
short patterns. This shows that the sample should belong to the
class with a few long patterns. This is because longer patterns
represent higher similarity with the samples of a dataset.
Case 2: The cover of a sample consists of few patterns
considering the code tables for both classes, but the patterns
have shorter sum-length under one class, say class 1, than
class 2. This says that the cover consists of patterns with higher
usage under class 1. Then the sample should be classified under
class 1.
Case 3: A sample consists of items that their support is zero
in one class, but not in the other class. This shows that the
sample should not be classified under the class which does not
support some of the items.
VII. CONCLUSION
We utilized the minimum description length (MDL) principle,
and designed a classifier for large transactional datasets. To do
so, we proposed an MDL-based model-selection method for
these datasets. The model selection involves first constructing
a list of closed frequent patterns (CFPs), and then selecting
a subset using the MDL criterion. We showed that, using
our method, we can dramatically shorten the list by giving
priority to longer patterns as the compression is mainly achieved
through longer patterns. This is important as extracting all CFPs,
and then summarizing them is computational very expensive
due to pattern explosion. We applied our classifier to a dataset
of API calls for static malware detection in portable executable
(PE) files. We also applied deep neural networks to this dataset
to obtain the state-of-the-art performance. The comparison
showed that we can obtain an accuracy very close to deep
neural networks for our dataset. We also discussed that we can
consider MDL-based classifiers as intrinsically interpretable
classifiers. Although we might need to pay a small penalty in
terms of accuracy, interpretability motivates us to use MDL-
based classifiers. We believe that such interpretability can
provide a good stepping stone to developing a robust classifier
that can withstand evasion attacks. An understanding of why a
certain decision is made can provide useful hints about how to
counteract functionality-preserving modifications to malware
samples.
APPENDIX
In this appendix, we present the two algorithms which have
been used in this work for CFPM, and clustering.
A. LCM Algorithm
We here provide an overview of the LCM algorithm [12]
for CFPM in transactional datasets. In the LCM algorithm, the
closure of a pattern P is defined as
Clo(P) = J (D(P)),
where J (S) = ∩Ti∈STi. Hence, for every pairs of patterns P
and Q, we have
• If P ⊆ Q, then Clo(P) ⊆ Clo(Q),
• A pattern P is closed if and only if Clo(P) = P .
In the LCM algorithm, the key notion of prefix preserving
closure extension (ppc-extension) is also defined as follows. A
pattern Q is called a ppc-extension of P if
• i) Q = Clo(P ∪ {i}) and,
• ii) P(i− 1) = Q(i− 1),
for some i /∈ P and i > coreind(P). P(i) = P ∩ {1, 2, . . . , i},
and the core index of P , coreind(P), is the minimum index j ∈
P such that D(P(j)) = D(P).
Based on the notion of ppc-extension, the LCM algorithm
works as follows. It starts with an empty pattern where the
core index of an empty set is considered to be zero, i.e.,
coreind({}) = 0. All the frequent ppc-extensions of the empty
pattern are calculated. Then, for every newly generated frequent
ppc-extension, this procedure is repeated. The algorithm ends
when there is no new frequent ppc-extension. All the generated
frequent ppc-extensions are considered as the output of this
algorithm. It has been proved that this outputs all the CFPs.
B. CLOPE Algorithm
We here provide an overview of the CLOPE algorithm [15]
as a fast and scalable algorithm for clustering transactional
datasets. This algorithm uses the global criterion function
defined as
Profit =
∑k
i=1
H(Ci)
W (Ci) |Ci|∑k
i=1 |Ci|
=
∑k
i=1
S(Ci)
W 2(Ci) |Ci|∑k
i=1 |Ci|
, (5)
where H(Ci), W (Ci), and S(Ci) are the height, the width,
and the size of cluster i, respectively. The width of a cluster
C is calculated as W (C) = | ∪Ti∈C Ti|. The size of a cluster
C is calculated as S(C) =
∑
Ti∈C |Ti|. Using the width and
the size of a cluster C, its height is defined as H(C) = S(C)W (C) .
9The global criterion function in (5) can be generalized as
Profit =
∑k
i=1
S(Ci)
W r(Ci) |Ci|∑k
i=1 |Ci|
,
where r, called repulsion factor, is used to have control over
intra-cluster similarity. Larger repulsion factor leads to clusters
in which transactions share more common items.
The CLOPE algorithm consists of two phases: allocation
phase, and refinement phase. In the allocation phase, we start
reading transactions one by one. We either allocate a transaction
to an exiting cluster or create a new cluster. This is done to
maximise the profit. In the refinement phase, we start reading
transactions again. In this phase, we check whether moving
a transaction to another existing cluster or a new cluster can
increase the profit. If a transaction is moved, we update the
clusters, and continue to scan the whole dataset. The algorithm
in the refinement phase ends when none of the transactions is
moved in an iteration.
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